The lack of privacy is one of the main reasons that limits trust in e-commerce. Current e-commerce practice enforces a customer to disclose her identity to the e-shop and the use of credit cards makes it straightforward for an e-shop to know the real identity of its customers. Although there are some payment systems based on untraceable tokens, they are not as widely used as credit cards. Furthermore, even without buying anything, a customer is already disclosing some information about who or where she may be by just connecting to the e-shop's web server and leaving behind an IP-address. In this paper, we present novel components that enable secure pseudonymous e-commerce. On the one hand, these components allow a customer to browse through an e-shop, select goods, and pay the goods with her credit card such that neither the e-shop operator nor the credit card issuer nor an eavesdropper is able to get any information about the customer's identity. On the other hand, it is guaranteed that none of the involved parties is able to act dishonestly during the credit card payment. Such a system could greatly enhance trust in e-commerce since it overcomes the customers' privacy concerns.
Introduction
During the past years, people have become more sensitive regarding privacy issues in the Internet. They realised that they leave all sorts of traces when surfing the Web or exchanging e-mail messages. Encryption provides the means to protect the privacy with respect to third parties in the sense that eavesdropping becomes very difficult, and the popularity of tools such as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [Zimmermann, 29] underlines its need. However, there are situations where the protection of privacy should go even further, and that is when anonymity comes into play. The requirement for anonymity in the Internet is completely justifiable since many situations in the real life are anonymous, e.g., traditional stores offer a certain degree of anonymity for their customers if they pay with cash. Therefore, it is desirable that online shopping offers this anonymity as well.
Generally, the process of buying goods at an e-commerce store consists of several parts: (1) a customer (Alice) browses through the e-shop, looks at information about products, chooses the products she wants, and fills them into her shopping cart; (2) she proceeds to the checkout and provides a credit card, which is checked by the e-shop; (3) the e-shop may contact Alice via e-mail to inform her about the situation of the order; (4) after Alice's credit is cleared out, she has access to the products she has paid for.
Traditionally, none of these parts is anonymous. When browsing through the e-shop, IPpackets are sent from the customer's machine to the e-shop and vice versa. These packets contain the sender and receiver's IP-addresses. Note that most modern browsers employ advanced security options and give the user the option to disable Java applets, JavaScripts, and cookies. In addition they can establish encrypted and authenticated connections to protect the data exchanged between the browser and the web server, but none of these measures gives the user anonymity since each packet still carries the IP-addresses of both sender and receiver. An eavesdropper or the e-shop can easily derive Alice's identity or at least the name of the computer she is using from those packets. When Alice accesses her e-mail server to check if there are messages from the e-shop, she also leaves behind traces to her identity. More seriously, the messages sent by e-shops are rarely encrypted, and hence, can be easily accessed by eavesdroppers. Finally, when Alice has to submit information about her credit card to the e-shop, she discloses even more of her identity.
The main problem in the online world is that Alice has absolutely no control over what happens with the traces she leaves in the Internet. Merchants can sell data about her shopping habits to others. Administrators of web servers can give away their server logs to other companies. Somebody can collect a lot of data and prepare an extensive profile on Alice's personal preferences and sell this information to others. Alice has no way to know if this is happening. In the real life, Alice has much more control about the information she is willing to give away. If she wants to keep her privacy in a bookstore, she does not tell anybody her name and simply pays with cash. This is not possible in the online world, as we have explained above. We strongly believe that this lack of privacy is one of the main reasons that hinders a faster growth of e-commerce, since it limits trust in online shopping by its potential customers.
The World-Wide Web Consortium (W3C)'s Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) project [Reagle and Cranor, 18] is certainly a step in the right direction to protect the privacy of web users. The goal of P3P is to clarify a web site's privacy practices to its users. When a web site or e-shop is contacted, the user receives the privacy practices of that site. The user can accept these practices, reject them and ask for an alternative proposal, or send another proposal herself. If an agreement between user and web site is reached, the communication continues, otherwise it is terminated. However, P3P only specifies the protocol for exchanging structured data to reach an agreement, but it cannot do anything to enforce the privacy practices a web site has proposed: even if an e-shop has promised not to give away information about the user to third parties, there is no way for the user to check if the e-shop complies with the rules. In addition, P3P cannot do anything to hide the user's identity from the e-shop.
